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Matthew 0. Jackson 
California Institute of Technology 
We analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism used in Andorra, which 
is called La Crema in the local language. This mechanism relies on 
households' announced property values to determine how much a 
household is reimbursed in the case of a fire and how payments are 
apportioned among other households. The only Pareto-efficient al- 
location reachable through the mechanism requires that all house- 
holds honestly report the true value of their property. However, such 
honest reporting is not an equilibrium except in the extreme case in 
which the property values are identical for all households. Neverthe- 
less, as the size of the society becomes large, the benefits from devi- 
ating from truthful reporting vanish, and all the nondegenerate equi- 
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libria of the mechanism are nearly truthful and approximately Pareto 
efficient. 
I. Introduction 
Mutual insurance companies write a large fraction of insurance policies 
in many sectors.1 They have been very successful for several reasons. 
First, as Malinvaud (1973, p. 398) points out, future markets provide 
only a remote idealization to the actual mechanism for risk allocation 
since "the ideal market system is too costly to implement." On the con- 
trary, pooling individual risk by means of mutual insurance policies 
"permits substantial economizing on market transactions" (Cass, Chi- 
chilnisky, and Wu 1996, p. 335). Another important reason for the suc- 
cess of mutual insurance is that through peer monitoring it can solve 
some moral hazard problems that plague incorporated insurance com- 
panies.2 While these problems are well understood, mutual insurance 
arrangements also solve other informational problems relating to the 
discovery of the value of insured property, as we show here. 
In this paper we present and analyze a real-life mutual fire insurance 
mechanism that has been functioning for over a century and a half in 
Andorra, a small principality in the Pyrenees, a rural mountainous area 
of western Europe. In this mechanism, called La Crema in the local 
language, each participating household must report a value. In case 
there is a fire, the owner of the burned household receives her reported 
value, which is paid by all participating households (including herself) 
in proportion to their reported values. We focus on the rules of La 
Crema because they are particularly clear from a game-theoretic point 
of view, they are by no means exceptional, and the mechanism has some 
remarkable properties.3 
'Williams, Smith, and Young (1997, p. 398) state that "advance premium mutuals write 
almost 40 percent of the life insurance in force and almost 23 percent of the property 
and liability insurance premiums." 
2 According to Heimer (1985, p. 64), "Mutuals seem to have been more effective than 
stock companies in constructing such incentive systems, particularly in the early phases 
of their history. Individual industrialists were sometimes large enough to make investment 
in research on fire prevention worthwhile, but stock companies discouraged the provision 
of public goods by appropriating too much of the saving from decreased fire losses." 
Obviously, mutuals have problems of their own, or they would be the only organizational 
form. Garber (1993, p. 8) writes that "from a financial perspective, the key impediment 
to mutual life company stability, growth and development, is that equity capital can be 
raised only through retained earnings from the company's operations." Also, mutuals are 
very difficult to take over, which makes the corporate governance problem harder to solve, 
especially in large mutuals. 
3 The term "mutual insurance" (often "mutual" for short) covers a variety of insurance 
systems. Mutuals are generally corporations owned by their policyholders and are struc- 
tured for their benefit. There are two main types of mutuals. "Advance premium mutuals" 
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In particular, the properties of the La Crema mechanism that we ex- 
plore concern its efficiency characteristics and the incentives it provides 
for truthful reporting of property values. One important characteristic 
is that the mechanism allows for announcement of any value by house- 
holds and does not seek any appraisal or cross report by any witnesses. 
Moreover, as we discuss below, all that needs to be verified is that the 
property burned, and then the announced value is reimbursed. This is 
potentially a nice feature because it allows the mechanism to insure the 
"subjective" value of property (as a welfarist would like) rather than the 
appraisable market value. The subjective value can include sentimental 
factors that could not be valued appropriately by the market. This ad- 
ditional feature of the mechanism will be useful only if the mechanism 
provides incentives to (approximately) announce truthfully and pro- 
vides for efficient risk sharing. We shall see that, under appropriate 
conditions, the mechanism performs these tasks quite well, and without 
having to resort to audits or other forms of "independent" assessments. 
Let us now discuss the mechanism's performance in more detail. 
With regard to efficiency, the mechanism places strong constraints 
on the possible risk sharing that can take place since reimbursements 
and payments are both scaled directly in terms of the announced prop- 
erty values. For instance, if households have constant (and identical) 
relative risk aversion, the only Pareto-efficient allocation that is reach- 
able through the game requires that all households truthfully report 
the value of their property. Things are even worse with constant (and 
identical) absolute risk aversion since then no Pareto-efficient allocation 
is obtainable as an outcome in the game regardless of how the an- 
nouncements are varied.4 
With regard to the incentives that the mechanism provides for truthful 
reporting of property values, we show that there is an equilibrium in 
which all households report the true value of their insured property if 
and only if these valuations are exactly the same across households. 
Apart from this extreme case of identical property values, we show that 
set premiums at a rate that is expected to cover expenses and expected losses and build 
up a fund for contingencies. "Assessment mutuals" differ from advance premium mutuals 
in that they have a right to assess the policyholders (i.e., collect money after a loss). 
Technically La Crema is an assessment mutual, in particular, one that is entirely based on 
assessments after a loss, but in which those assessments are based on valuations that are 
reported in advance. It is important to note that the rules of this mutual insurance system 
are not unique to La Crema. A similar proportional assessment rule is adopted, for instance, 
in marine insurance clubs: "At the beginning of the year the shipowners are given an 
estimate of the amount (call) they will be required to pay into the [Protection and In- 
demnity] Club. However, the eventual call is dependent upon the claim made by all 
members: each member knows only the proportion of the total cost they will be required 
to bear" (Bennett 2000, p. 152; emphasis in the original). 
4 As one would expect, by the nature of the mechanism, where only property values are 
reported, differences in risk aversion do not seem to be the answer either. 
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households with relatively high property values have an incentive to 
overreport their value (to increase reimbursement from others when 
needed) and households with low property values have an incentive to 
underreport their value (to decrease payment to others when asked 
for). 
The analysis described above appears to be in conflict with the con- 
ventional wisdom among the actual participants in the game, who are 
happy with the functioning of the mechanism and consider that the 
only natural thing one can do is to report the true value of the property. 
Since the mechanism has existed for a long time, one would think that 
tradition or their own experience could furnish enough information 
for agents to know their best response. In fact, the incentive and effi- 
ciency properties that the mechanism exhibits are quite appealing and 
are closely in line with local wisdom once we examine large enough 
societies and consider approximate rather than exact efficiency. 
From the perspective of larger societies, we first show that households 
in large enough societies have arbitrarily small incentives to deviate from 
honest reporting, or, in other words, truth is an e-Nash equilibrium. 
Second, we show that in large enough societies, the (exact) Nash equi- 
libria of the La Crema mechanism involve reports that are arbitrarily 
close to the truth.5 Third, the Nash equilibria (and e-Nash equilibria) 
are arbitrarily close to being Pareto efficient in large enough societies. 
Finally, we show that, for reasonable parameterizations of utility func- 
tions, what is needed in the statements above in terms of "large enough" 
societies can actually be reasonably small. Moreover, these results are 
robust to variations in the informational structure since they hold both 
with complete and with private information. 
The interest of this institution is manifold and quite different from 
other studies of risk-sharing institutions.6 First of all, the La Crema in- 
stitution refers to a specialized type of risk, which allows us to model it 
relatively simply and yet still accurately and also limits the potential 
explanations for the behavior of participants. Second, the transfer rules 
are quite explicit and are easily modeled. Finally, the rural society under 
consideration is relatively stable during the whole period of the mech- 
5 One should note, of course, that while the larger scale of society may solve the reporting 
problem of La Crema, it may create other problems since providing adequate fire preven- 
tion can become now a worse public-good problem. "Today's P&I [Protection and Indem- 
nity] Clubs are global in scale, with the largest containing over 20 percent of the world's 
oceangoing fleet. Communal responsibility may be unrealistic in such large-scale institu- 
tions because free rider problems become more difficult to monitor and control as group 
size and dispersion increase" (Bennett 2000, p. 148). 
6 Such as the ones mentioned in McCloskey (1989), Townsend (1993), or Fafchamps 
(1999). Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993, 1994) examine the allocative performance of a 
simple, easily organized, and widely observed institution for financial intermediation called 
rosca (rotating savings and credit associations). 
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anism's operation (e.g., there are no instances of famines during its 
existence), and so wealth constraints are not an issue. 
Before we move on, let us remark on the comparison of the La Crema 
institution to a competitive insurance market. First, as discussed above, 
the equilibrium outcomes accounting for incentives will result in ap- 
proximately efficient outcomes, and so the mechanism is not dominated 
in any strong way by a competitive market. Second, as mentioned above 
and discussed in more detail below, the mechanism allows for insurance 
of the subjective value of property and requires only the verification 
that a building burned and does not require any assessment of the value 
of the building. Third, as discussed below, the mutual mechanism in a 
tight-knit society provides incentives for some peer monitoring that can 
help eliminate the moral hazard problem of arson. Fourth, under La 
Crema, no transfers or payments are made in the absence of damages, 
which is in contrast to most all other mechanisms for insurance.7 This 
item might actually go a long way toward explaining the use of La Crema. 
This society was, at the time of inception, relatively poor and physically 
isolated a large part of the year, so transferring income across periods 
or to and from outlying individuals was costly and difficult.8 This iso- 
lation could produce transactions costs that make operation of a com- 
petitive insurance market prohibitively costly. This, coupled with the 
relatively low incidence of fires (just 21 between 1884 and 1950, as 
documented in App. table B1) and the nice approximate efficiency 
properties of La Crema, makes mutual insurance a sensible institutional 
arrangement and the absence of transfers in the absence of fire tech- 
nologically expedient. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes 
the mechanism (informally and formally) and gives some background 
on the society in which the institution operates. Section III discusses 
the equilibrium and efficiency properties of the mechanism. Section IV 
provides results characterizing the equilibria and approximate efficiency 
of the mechanism in "large" societies. Section V presents conclusions. 
7 It can be shown, for instance, that if individuals have constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) preferences, then the truthful reporting outcome of La Crema is the only allocation 
that is Pareto efficient under the requirement that there are no transfers in the absence 
of burnings. 
8 "Andorra is a poor country which has often experienced scarcity" (Brutails [1904] 
1965, p. 11; translated from French by the authors). The title of a subsection of Brutails' 
book (p. 15) also reflects the geographical isolation of the country: Relative Isolation: 
The Roads. A historical account of social and economic life in nineteenth-century Andorra 
can be found in L6pez Muntanya, Peruga Guerrero, and Tudel Fillat (1988), who docu- 
ment the many forms of cooperative life set up in the country to cope with economic 
precariousness: "the economic difficulties of the country made the Andorrans, already on 
the eighteenth century, form associations, with the goal of providing mutual assistance in 
case of sickness, death, and so on" (p. 147; translated from Catalan by the authors). 
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Appendix A contains the proofs, and tables in Appendix B provide some 
data from the institution. 
II. La Crema 
A. The Institution of La Crema 
In 1882, and under the initiative of the local priest, the 102 farms of 
Canillo in the Principality of Andorra9 organized themselves into a fire 
insurance cooperative named La Crema. By that time, Andorra was mostly 
a rural area living in quasi autarchy, and La Crema was conceived as a 
risk-sharing institution to cope with fire damages that were a source of 
major worries to farmers in mountainous Canillo, where sinuous and 
steep roads did not allow for quick or effective fire brigades. Since its 
early beginnings, La Crema had two roles: as a logistic structure, to 
organize the local firefighter forces; and as a financial structure, to 
guarantee pecuniary compensations to farms suffering destruction by 
fire.'0 
La Crema is organized as follows. Once a year, the cooperative mem- 
bers meet in a general assembly, the consell de La Crema (La Crema 
council). The meeting is fixed on the Sunday that falls two weeks before 
the carnival, and attendance is compulsory for all members." The meet- 
ing is supervised by two permanent secretaris (secretaries), who are 
elected for life. During this general assembly, each farmer announces 
a value for each of the buildings that he or she owns (farm, barn, 
cowshed, stable, etc.). Conventional wisdom suggests that farmers report 
the true and total value of their property, and La Crema cooperative 
members typically do so. This amount is noted in three different books: 
each secretari keeps a copy at home, and a third book is stored at the 
9 The Principality of Andorra, located in the heart of the Pyrenees between France and 
Spain, is one of both the smallest and the oldest states in western Europe: the national 
territory is 468 square kilometers, and today's frontiers were definitely settled in 1278. 
The country is divided administratively into seven parishes: Canillo, Ordino, La Massana, 
Encamp, Andorra la Vella, SantJulia de Loria, and Escaldes-Engordany. Agriculture had 
been the major economic activity of Andorra until the end of the nineteenth century; 
tourism, commerce and financial services are now the basic national economic activities. 
In 1999, the gross domestic product per capita was U.S.$20,252. See http:// 
www.turisme.ad/angles/ for more details. 
o1 La Crema is still active and intervened recently to financially compensate Cal Soldevila, 
whose barn burned in August 1998, and Cal Batista for similar damages in July 1985. 
1 An absent member without a good excuse is fined. The last fine dates back to 1946. 
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parish town hall.'2 In the case of a fire, the owner of the damaged 
building receives compensation equal at most to the value noted in the 
book for the current year, depending on the extent of the damages. 
This financial compensation is made by the other cooperative members, 
who pay in proportion to the share their own announced property value 
represents with respect to the total of all values announced by La Crema 
members. The existing evidence indicates that La Crema-announced 
valuations are not used for any transactions (e.g., real estate transactions 
or taxation) outside of the La Crema mutual insurance mechanism.13 An 
early reference and brief description of the La Crema transfer rule can 
also be found in Brutails ([1904] 1965, p. 42): 
As it is often the case with societies living in inhospitable areas, 
solidarity is highly developed among the Andorrans, and has 
given rise in particular to mutual fire-insurance associations. 
Inhabitants of a same village can usually all become insurance 
society fellows. Nonetheless, buildings offering fire-risks above 
average may be denied insurance coverage. In case of damage, 
all fellows pay to compensate the owner for her loss, and they 
do so in proportion to the value for which they are themselves 
insured. [Translated from French by the authors]'4 
During the yearly meeting, four comissionats (commissioners) and 
12 Details regarding the history and operation of La Crema as well as data on past trans- 
actions have been obtained from different sources. First, conversations with locals provided 
thorough information about the functioning of the institution. We are particularly in- 
debted to one secretari, Josep Torres Babot, Cal Jep, and to the Canillo public librarian, 
Ma Dolors Calv6 Casal, Cal Soldevila, for long, valuable discussions. Second, bibliographic 
sources added a historical perspective (Brutails 1904; L6pez Muntanya et al. 1988). Finally, 
the second secretari, Benito Marquet Armengol, Cal Ton de Borr6, gave us access to his 
copy of the La Crema book. This book, as well as two other copies of it, contains data on 
announced values and past damages (see App. tables B1 and B2), the minutes of the 
yearly councils, and the standing rules of the insurance cooperative (which we discuss in 
detail and quote from in what follows). 
13 This evidence comes, first of all, from our discussions with the secretaris. In addition, 
one should note that Andorra has only indirect taxation, so no assessment of personal 
income or wealth is needed for fiscal purposes. As for real estate transactions, they were 
virtually absent until the 1960s. A reason for this can be found in the ethnographic study 
of Comas d'Argemir and Pujadas (1997). They show that Andorra has a troncal family 
system, which is based on the uninterrupted succession of generations living in the same 
house. Also, the inheritance law of Andorra (based on Roman civil law) provides that only 
the older child of a family inherits the undivided agricultural property. In this way, the 
family farm remains a whole. 
14 L6pez Muntanya et al. (1988) also state that for the mutual fire insurance association 
of Ordino (another municipality), "the damages will be paid, among all the members of 
the association, in proportion to the value that each one has declared for his own property" 
(p. 150; translated from Catalan by the authors). The municipality of Massana has a mutual 
fire insurance association, and the rules for payment and reimbursement are like those 
of Ordino, according to L6pez Muntanya et al. 
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three recaudadors (money collectors) are elected for one year. The co- 
missionats are responsible for the logistic and technical activities. First, 
they guarantee that all cooperative members take the appropriate pre- 
cautionary measures to prevent possible fires by reporting to the consell 
de La Crema carelessness in farm and building maintenance and to report 
any problematic behavior. Second, they are in charge of the fire-fighting 
material owned by the cooperative (fire hoses etc.). Finally, in case of 
fire, the comissionats fix, in accordance with the concerned farmer, the 
total value of the damages to be reimbursed (depending on the extent 
of the damages and not exceeding the value noted in the book) and 
submit it to the consell for approval. The three elected recaudadors each 
represent a different geographical area: Canillo, la Ribera, and Prats.'5 
In case of fire, and once the amount to be transferred to the damaged 
farm is fixed by the consell under proposition of the comissionats, the 
recaudadors are responsible for collecting the contributions of the La 
Crema members within their area of intervention. 
We emphasize one aspect of the reimbursement. The way in which 
the comissionats assess the value of damages is quite simple, and little 
needs to be verifiable. When reporting the value of a farm, a family can 
subdivide the value into values associated with separate buildings (house, 
barn, stable, woodshed, mill, etc.; see App. table B2). When a building 
or more is destroyed, the comissionat's only role is to verify that indeed 
the building(s) did burn.16 There is no attempt (or need) to assess the 
actual value of the property destroyed. As stated in Article 2 of La Crema, 
"in case of a loss, the announced value and no more than that will be 
reimbursed"; that is, the farmer receives reimbursement for the value 
he or she originally reported. As we shall argue, that (subjective) value 
will be approximately truthfully announced in equilibrium. Thus the 
only thing that needs to be verified is that the property burned. 
In the formal game-theoretic analysis, we focus on the incentives to 
report truthfully the value of the property. As we mention in the Intro- 
duction, the relevant valuation here is the individual subjective value, 
which may be very different from the market valuation. Because of this, 
there is quite a lot of freedom in the mechanism for reporting valuations. 
Unfortunately, this implies that there may be incentives to overinsure 
one's property and then burn it. If players could commit arson (and 
not be caught), that would destroy the possibility of insurance (La Crema 
or otherwise), which is why commercial firms typically disallow insuring 
15 The first region, Canillo, corresponds to the main town with the same name. The 
second region, la Ribera, includes the following villages: Els Plans, Els Vilars, El Tarter, 
L'Aldosa, L'Armiana, Ransol, and Soldeu. Finally, the last region, Prats, includes El Forn, 
Meritxell, Molleres, and Prats. 
'6 Partial burning of a building is extremely unlikely given the harsh terrain, wood 
construction, and limited fire-fighting capabilities. 
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a property above its market price. There are two deterrents to arson 
under La Crema. First, as under other insurance arrangements, there is 
a chance of being caught and suffering severe penalties (long prison 
terms). Second, La Crema, being a mutual insurance arrangement in a 
tighty knit society, adds another dimension that a commercial or mar- 
ket-based insurance scheme would not: given that each household is 
insured by its neighbors, the neighbors have an added incentive to 
monitor the behavior of a given household to make sure that it abides 
by the fire codes and does not commit arson.17 
B. The La Crema Game 
There is a set N of households, with INI = n. Each household has a 
utility function ui and wealth wi E [c, C], where C > c> 0. Let W = 
EiENwi. We take each ui to be twice continuously differentiable and 
strictly concave. 
The previous paragraph expresses the central simplifying assumption 
we make in modeling the game: we treat wealth as the property that 
may potentially burn. Utility functions may, of course, be normalized 
so that this assumption is made without loss of generality. But we are 
ignoring the subdivision of properties into separate insurable units (as 
discussed above, e.g., house, barn, stables, etc.), which is done in practice 
as seen in Appendix table B2. Adding the consideration of such sub- 
divisions is a relatively straightforward extension, but at the expense of 
considerable complication in notation and exposition.18 
Let S = 2N be the set of possible states. In particular, s e S is a list 
of farms that burned. For instance, s = {2, 7, 12} denotes that farms 2, 
7, and 12 (and only those farms) burned. Let Sk) = {sI Ist = k} be the 
set of states in which exactly k farms burn. Note that S = u0S'(^'. For 
any i E N, let Si denote the set of states for which farm i burns (perhaps 
along with some other farms) and S^(k) be the set of states for which k 
farms in addition to farm i burn. Let p, be the probability of state s. We 
assume that all states in which an identical number k of farms burn are 
equally likely. That is, for all s, s' E S(k, ps = p,,, and we denote this 
17 Article 11 of La Crema states that "any mutualist who is known to go about with wooden 
torches, or the damage is known in any way to be due to carelessness, will not be reimbursed 
for damages by the mutual." In the same vein, a new article (number 21 dated 1928) 
deals with electric wiring and conditions it must meet. 
18 When subdivided properties are used, the calculations are still close to those we have. 
In particular, the calculations separate so that it is (almost) as though the subdivisions of 
a property were separate households. The main restriction that we must still maintain is 
the assumption on probabilities (Pk) as described below, where now k becomes the total 
number of subdivisions that burn. This still allows for the possibility of some correlation 
but does impose restrictions. 
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probability by p,.'9 A special case of this is one in which each farm burns 
with an independent and identical probability. Note, however, that it is 
not required that the burnings be independent. As an extreme example, 
it could be that p0 > 0, pn > 0, and Pk = 0 for all other k. This might be 
an example in which all the farms lie close to each other in a forest, 
so that either all farms burn or none burns. All we assume is that 
Pk > 0 for some k > 0, so that there is some chance of a fire. 
We now describe formally the rules of the La Crema game. Each house- 
hold sends a message mi E [0, 2C] to the coordinator, which is inter- 
preted to be an announcement of their (subjective) property value at 
risk.20 Let m = (mi, ..., mn) E [0, 2C]" be a vector of messages. Let 
M = ,iENmi and, for all s E S, let M, = Ei,,E,mi. The allocation rule 
used by the coordinator is the following: in state s E S, household i E 
s receives mi(M,/M), whereas each household j E N\s receives j - 
mj[(M- M,)/M]. One can easily check that 
v M-M M, M, 
j N\s M i s M 
namely, that the sum of the contributions by households j E N\s whose 
farms did not burn is equal to the sum that households i E s receive as 
a compensation for their losses. Note that if announcements are truthful 
(mi = w,), then in each state s the undamaged property is effectively 
distributed among all households in proportion to their wealths (so the 
final allocations are W[w,/W]). 
III. Discussion of the Game 
A. Equilibria 
The first proposition says that truthful announcements are a Nash equi- 
librium only in the case in which all wealths are identical. 
PROPOSITION 1. The La Crema game has a Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies in which mi = wi for all i e N if and only if wi = Wj, for all 
i, j E N. 
The proof of proposition 1 appears in Appendix A. The intuition 
behind the proposition is roughly as follows. Increasing mi has two ef- 
fects. First, it increases the reimbursement that household i receives in 
the case of a fire that consumes is property. Second, it increases the 
'9 This condition is important in the approximate efficiency and equilibrium results we 
obtain. If this condition does not hold, so that there are some asymmetries in relative 
probabilities that different farms burn, then one could form subgroups for insurance in 
which farms with similar probabilities were grouped together. This will become clear in 
the proofs of the propositions and in some discussion below. 20 The upper bound on announcements is arbitrarily set at twice the highest imaginable 
property value. Any upper bound would do. 
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liability that i faces in the event that some other household's property 
burns. Some heuristic calculations help illustrate the relative size of these 
two effects and the incentives that households have as a result. For 
simplicity, consider a situation in which at most one household will have 
a fire, and so we need consider only states of the form {i}, where i's 
property is destroyed.2 Consider what happens if i raises mi by some 
small amount e > 0. This increases i's reimbursement by (approximately) 
e(Mi/M) if the state is {i} (recall that Mi = Eyimj and M = 2jmj). It 
also increases the payments that i has to make to household j : i in 
state {(j by mj(e/M). Note that when we sum across states, these cancel 
each other out. That is, 
Mi E 
M Mi M 
So, by lowering the announcement mi, household i transfers wealth from 
state (i} to the other states (j}, j * i, and vice versa from raising the 
announcement. So what are the households' incentives in the game? 
Given their risk aversion, they wish to come as close as possible to 
smoothing their wealth across the states. If all households have exactly 
the same wealth, then at a truthful announcement in the La Crema game, 
household i gets final wealth w,(W/W) in state s and, given the equal 
starting wealths, is equal across each state s = {k}. Thus the households' 
wealths are evenly spread across these states, and they have no incentives 
to change their announcements. Next, consider the case in which house- 
holds do not have the same wealth. Order them so that w, > wn, > 
*.. > w1 and wn > wl. Then notice that farmer 1 consumes the highest 
amount in the state in which her property burns, wl(WI/W) versus 
wl(Wj/W) in some state j * 1, since W1 > W2 > * ' > W,. By lowering 
ml a little, household 1 decreases consumption in the state {1}, where 
farm 1 burns, and distributes a commensurate increase among other 
states {j}, where farm j * 1 burns. As households are risk averse, this 
strictly benefits household 1. Conversely, farmer n consumes less in the 
state in which farm n burns compared to states in which some other 
farm burns. By raising mn, farmer n shifts wealth from states {j}, j * 
n, to state {n}. Roughly, households with below-average property value 
will benefit from underreporting, and those with above-average property 
value will benefit from overreporting. 
The proposition tells us that the game does not have an equilibrium 
in which households report the true value of their property if there is 
21 The state in which no farm burns has no impact since no payments are made. States 
in which several farms bur have calculations analogous to those discussed here, since 
the consideration is what happens if i's farm burns vs. some other farm burns (on the 
margin). 
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any heterogeneity in household value. The case of heterogeneity is ar- 
guably the interesting case, since it would be hard to see the reason for 
an elaborate mechanism (which is not costless to administer) unless 
there were some kind of heterogeneity. Otherwise, there would be com- 
mon knowledge precisely about the thing that the coordinator is trying 
to elucidate. 
This result still holds when there is private information about property 
values. All that is needed (this is clear from the proof as well as in the 
intuition above) is for some households to be fairly sure that they have 
the top or bottom property value (or that they are close to either). 
The following remark shows that the problem goes even further. 
When there are only two households, there is no interior pure-strategy 
equilibrium to the game at all. Either both households refuse to par- 
ticipate (there is always such a degenerate equilibrium in which neither 
household declares any wealth given the expectation that the other will 
not) or the wealthier household has such a strong incentive to over- 
report that it reports the maximum allowed property value. 
REMARK 1. Let n = 2. If wl[1 + (w2/4C)] < w2 (a sufficient condition 
for which is w, < 4w2), then the only pure-strategy Nash equilibria of 
the La Crema game are (mI, m2) = (0, 0) and (ml, m2) = 
(2w,C/(4C+ Wi), 2C). 
It is hard to see what an insurance mechanism is trying to accomplish 
if it leads to such extreme outcomes. 
Before providing an answer to this paradox, let us examine the Pareto 
efficiency characteristics of the La Crema game. 
B. Efficiency 
Let W, = EiNWi - Eis Wi. Thus W is the total wealth in the society given 
that s is the state. Let a risk-sharing allocation be any random vector 
x = (x1, ..., xn) such that ,ieNXi(S) = W in each state s. Thus a risk- 
sharing allocation is some distribution of the wealth in the society. Note 
that this includes risk-sharing schemes that are not available as outcomes 
of the La Crema game. Let Eu,(x) denote the expected utility of i E N 
under the risk-sharing allocation x. Let xm denote the risk-sharing al- 
location that comes from announcements m in the La Crema game, and 
let xw denote the risk-sharing allocation that comes from truthful an- 
nouncements (mi = wi) in the La Crema game. 
We begin with efficiency results for the special case in which house- 
holds have identical CRRA utility functions (i.e., ui(ci) = cT/y with 
ay * 1). We show that even in this special case the only Pareto-efficient22 
22 Pareto efficiency is, of course, relative to the expected utilities for an allocation. Thus 
expectations are taken before the state is realized, and so households do not know which 
property has been destroyed. 
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allocations that can be reached as outcomes of the La Crema game arise 
from reporting the true value of one's household. The reason is that 
equality of marginal rates of substitution across states of the world re- 
quires that ratios of consumption are equalized for all states of the world. 
This can happen only when households report the true value of the 
property. 
PROPOSITION 2. If households have identical CRRA utility functions 
and there exist i, j E N such that wi * wj, then there is a unique Pareto- 
efficient risk-sharing allocation that is reachable through the La Crema 
game. It is to have each household report truthfully. So xW(s)= 
wi(W/W) for all i E N, for all s E S. 
We note that propositions 1 and 2 imply that the only Pareto-efficient 
outcome of the La Crema game (under identical CRRA) cannot be sus- 
tained as a Nash equilibrium. 
Given that (Arrow-Debreu complete market) Walrasian outcomes are 
efficient, an interesting question in this context is whether the unique 
Pareto-efficient outcome reachable through the La Crema game (when 
households have identical CRRA utility functions) corresponds to the 
Arrow-Debreu complete market Walrasian equilibrium of this economy 
when the endowments for the household i are wi in state s t Si and zero 
in states Si. The following remark shows that this is generically not the 
case. 
REMARK 2. Let the probability that any farm burns be given by p> 
0 and have this probability be independent across farms. If there exist 
k and j such that wk * wj, then the unique Pareto-efficient allocation 
reachable through the La Crema game when the players have identical 
CRRA utility functions is different from the outcome of the complete 
market Walrasian equilibrium of the La Crema economy. 
The next proposition shows that if agents have constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) utility functions, then difficulties in reaching efficiency 
are even worse for the La Crema game in that all the allocations that 
are reachable through the game are inefficient. The reason is that Pareto 
optimality with identical CARA utility functions requires that differences 
in utilities across states of the world are equalized across agents. This 
demands on the one hand that reports are the same for all agents and 
at the same time that they are truthful. With heterogeneous endow- 
ments, the two requirements are not compatible. 
PROPOSITION 3. If, for some i, j E N, wi * Wj and households have 
identical CARA utility functions, then there is no Pareto-efficient allo- 
cation that can be reached through the La Crema game. 
The following remark shows that differences in risk attitudes across 
households will not help to explain the inefficiency of the La Crema 
game. This is evident when the probability that no property burns is 
different from zero (po > 0) because in that case Pareto efficiency re- 
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quires transfers from the relatively more risk averse agents to the rel- 
atively less risk averse agents when no property burns (i.e., in state 
s E S(?)), and La Crema specifies no transfers for s E S(). The remark 
shows that even if there were some household burning in all states of 
the world (p, = 0), there would still be no Pareto-efficient outcome of 
the game. 
REMARK 3. Assume that n > 3, household i = 1 is risk neutral, the 
other households have (possibly heterogeneous) CRRA utility functions, 
and, for some i, j E N, wi i wj; then there is no Pareto-efficient allo- 
cation that is obtainable through the La Crema game. 
The results above leave us with a puzzle that needs to be explained. 
Pareto efficiency can be obtained only through the La Crema game in 
some extreme cases, and even then the corresponding allocation cannot 
be sustained as an equilibrium of this game as long as there is any 
heterogeneity in household property values. So why would the La Crema 
game be used? An analysis of larger societies provides an answer. 
IV. Larger Societies 
While proposition 1 shows that truth is a Nash equilibrium only in 
extreme (and implausible) situations, the La Crema game still has very 
nice features in terms of its equilibrium structure and efficiency char- 
acteristics. We point these out in a series of propositions. First, we show 
that truth is an e-Nash equilibrium for large enough societies. Thus the 
gains from over- or understating one's wealth are not large. While this 
suggests that the La Crema game will have nice properties, it is not 
completely convincing since it does not guarantee that the exact Nash 
equilibria will be close to truthful. Second, we show that there always 
exist (nondegenerate) Nash equilibria. Third, we show that all non- 
degenerate Nash equilibria are close to truthful in large societies. Thus 
the La Crema game provides incentives for individuals to play (approx- 
imately) truthfully. Finally, we show that truth and all announcements 
close to the truth are approximately Pareto efficient (with arbitrary 
utility functions). Taken together, these results show that the Nash equi- 
libria and c-Nash equilibria of the La Crema game are approximately 
efficient in large societies with arbitrary heterogeneity in preferences 
and endowments. 
In order to talk about large societies and approximation, we consider 
the following setting. Let n1, n2, n3, ... be an increasing sequence of 
integers such that nh -- o. Each h E N defines a La Crema game with 
population Nh of size nh. 
In addition, we maintain the following assumption on preferences in 
what follows for all i E Nh and for all h E F. 
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ASSUMPTION 1. For any tL > O, there exists 6 > 0 such that, if Iw - 
wil < 6, then Iu' (w) - u' (wi) < .t. 
Assumption 1 implies that the second derivative of utility functions 
has some bound that applies to all players and games.23 In other words, 
players are not arbitrarily risk averse. Note that no particular form is 
assumed for the utility functions ui, so they can differ across people as 
long as there is an upper bound on how risk averse people are. 
A. Approximate Equilibria 
PROPOSITION 4. For any e > 0, there exists an integer H such that, for 
any h > H, it is an e-Nash equilibrium of the La Crema game for all people 
in Nh to report truthfully (mi = wi). 
The proof of proposition 4 appears in Appendix A. To get a feeling 
for the intuition, let us do the following exercise. Changes of a given 
mi have relatively little impact on M = Ei mi in a large society, so let us 
treat M as fixed since the effects on it are second-order (these effects 
are carefully handled in App. A). Consider a scenario in which one farm 
burns, but we are not sure which. So the conditional expectation is 
1/n on each farm. What happens if household i increases mi by one 
unit? The gain is roughly 
m. M i(mi-m 
nj*i M \ M/ 
in the case in which it is i's farm that burns. The loss is 
1I 1 , mm,m 
~ 
mojuiWi-- 
nj*i J\ M / 
as we sum over the cases in which each other farm burns, since i is liable 
for an extra 1/M of each value mj. Since in a large society m,/M = 0, 
these approximately cancel at mi = wi, and so i does not gain much by 
changing mi. So under the La Crema game, the expected cost (in utils) 
of the insurance is approximately j2,im /Mu.(w,), and it pays off ap- 
proximately Ej,i m/Mu'(mi).24 
Another way to view this is to go back to the intuition discussed after 
proposition 1. Lowering household i's announcement effectively trans- 
fers wealth from states in which i' property burns to states in which 
23 Note that this assumption holds trivially in the CRRA case as long as -y is bounded 
from above. 
24 When we have more than two farms burning at a time, the argument becomes a bit 
more complicated, but we can still match up positive and negative terms. The marginal 
utilities with mi - (mi/M) and w - (mimJ/M) are replaced, respectively, by marginal utilities 
of something like mi - [m(mi + M,)/M] and wi - [ m(mj + Mj)/M]. Again, since m/Mn 
0, these terms equalize approximately when wi = mi. 
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some other property burns in i's place. The relative difference in i's 
wealth across these states under truthful reporting is negligible to begin 
with: wi(W/W) is almost the same as w(W,,/W) if s is a state in which 
i burns and s' is a corresponding state in which some other farm burns 
in i's place, since W/Wis almost the same as W,/Win a large society. 
The intuition above shows that La Crema is a subtle institution since 
the cost of insurance depends on u'(wi) and its payoff depends on 
u'(m,) and, most important, in a way that gives agents just the right 
incentives (in large economies in which M is approximately unaffected 
by i's announcement). 
Let us stress an important feature of the result in proposition 4. The 
bounds we use in the proof are robust to the information structure and 
the actions of the other agents. That is, they do not depend on the 
pk's, what the wj's are for j : i, and work uniformly across i's as long as 
assumption 1 is satisfied.25 In fact, all that is needed is that a household 
believes that its property value will be a relatively small amount of the 
total announced property value to have truth be nearly a best response. 
This robustness is important not just for realism's sake. In an environ- 
ment with complete information, there are formal mechanisms that 
implement "exactly" the efficient outcome, but this is not the case with 
incomplete information. 
EXAMPLE 1. There is a population of 100 households that each have 
the same preferences, ui(ci) = ci. The households differ in the value 
of their properties: half are of a "low" type with WL = 10,000, and the 
other half are of a "high" type with wH = 30,000. Let the probability 
that a fire burns a given property be 1/100 and be such that exactly 
one house burns.26 This allows for easy calculations and is not much 
different from the independently and identically distributed case in 
terms of incentives and expected utilities. In this case, if other house- 
holds are reporting truthfully, then a low type's best response is ap- 
proximately mi = 9,925, and the gain in expected utility of announcing 
9,925 compared to 10,000 is approximately 10-5 out of an expected 
utility of approximately 99.5, which is a gain of about only 10-5 percent. 
To put this in perspective, not participating leads to an expected utility 
of 99, and so the overall benefit of participating in La Crema is about 
0.5. Thus the gain of an optimal deviation from truth is very small even 
compared to the overall benefit from participation (10-5/0.5). Similar 
25 The proof uses the fact that p5's are equal across s's of the same size. We are not sure 
how the mechanism performs if there are drastic disparities in the probability of fires 
across properties. Regardless, La Crema could be made to work in such cases by separating 
properties into relatively homogeneous risk categories operating the mechanism separately 
over different risk categories, especially since much of the benefits can still be realized 
with relatively small numbers. 
26 So pi = 1/100 and Pk = 0 for k * 1; recall that pk is the probability of each state in 
which exactly k farms burn. 
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TABLE 1 
u(c,) = c, 
~Eui~ ~GAIN Eui BEST BEST 
Autarchy Truth Best Response RESPONSE RESPONSE 
n=2 99.000 99.370 99.420 .050 6,000 
n=4 99.000 99.452 99.459 .007 7,992 
n=100 99.000 99.500 99.500 10-5 9,925 
calculations for the high type lead to a best response (to truth by the 
others) of mi = 30,077 and a similar-sized gain (on the order of 10-5) 
compared to truthful announcing. 
Table 1 summarizes the results with these parameters for different 
population sizes. The results for ui(c) = ci9 and ui(ci) = cl are given in 
tables 2 and 3, respectively. For more risk averse u, than the ones we 
give, the differences between truth and best response are even smaller. 
Notice that the usual estimated values for the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion 
parameter are between -1 and -4 (see Szpiro [1986], Barsky et al. 
[1997], or Chou, Engle, and Kane [1992] and references therein). 
B. Equilibria 
While proposition 4 is somewhat reassuring that truthful reporting of 
property values can reasonably be expected in the La Crema game, it 
leaves open the possibility that the actual equilibrium could still be quite 
far from truthful. (Note that generally e-Nash equilibria need not be 
near Nash equilibria.) As we now show, however, the Nash equilibria of 
the La Crema game are in fact close to being truthful. 
Before we proceed, note that (0, ..., 0) is always an equilibrium of 
the La Crema game. We call this the degenerate quilibrium. Say that an 
equilibrium is nondegenerate if there is some player i who places prob- 
ability less than one on playing mi = 0. It can be shown that any strategy 
in which mi < wJ/2 is weakly dominated, and so the only equilibria that 
do not involve weakly dominated strategies must have mi > w,/2 (as is 
TABLE 2 
ui(ci) = C, 
~~Eu,~ ~GAIN 
BEST BEST 
Autarchy Truth Best Response RESPONSE RESPONSE 
n=2 3,941.3 3,943.5 3,944.1 .6 6,000 
n=4 3,941.3 3,944.5 3,944.6 .1 8,002 
n=100 3,941.3 3,945.2 345.2 10-3 9,925 
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TABLE 3 
u,(c,) = ci' 
Eu. GAIN 
BEST BEST 
Autarchy Truth Best Response RESPONSE RESPONSE 
n=2 2.4904 2.5080 2.5085 .0005 6,000 
n=4 2.4904 2.5090 2.5089 .0001 7,982 
n=100 2.4904 2.5094 2.5094 ... 9,925 
shown in App. A following eq. [A8]) .27 In fact, the following propositions 
show that nondegenerate equilibria exist and have some strong 
properties. 
PROPOSITION 5. There exists a nondegenerate Nash equilibrium of 
the La Crema game. Moreover, there exists a strict Nash equilibrium 
(and thus in pure and undominated strategies) in which each player i 
plays mi > w,/2 such that 4C2/W Imi, - wil. 
The proof of proposition 5 uses the following proposition, which 
establishes that all nondegenerate equilibria involve players playing 
within certain bounds of wi. 
PROPOSITION 6. In any nondegenerate Nash equilibrium of the La 
Crema game, all players place probability only on mi such that 
4C mi- wi 
W wi 
Thus 4C2/W> Imi - wil, and so as Wbecomes large, Imi - wil - 0 uni- 
formly across i for any mi in the support of any sequence of nondegen- 
erate Nash equilibria. 
The proof of proposition 6 follows intuition similar to that behind 
proposition 4. We know that the gain from misreporting is small in a 
large society, and the proof uses the strict concavity of ui to show that 
grossly misreporting cannot be a best response: if it involves gross un- 
derreporting, then there are substantial gains in insurance to be realized 
by increasing the report; if it involves gross overreporting, then the 
household is overexposed in its liability and benefits from decreasing 
the report. 
Propositions 4, 5, and 6 provide a resolution to the seeming conflict 
between the observation that with heterogeneous societies truthful re- 
porting is not an equilibrium of the La Crema game and the conventional 
wisdom among the actual participants of the game who think that it is 
best to report the true value of the property. These previous propositions 
27 In fact, mi = 0 is a best response only if all other players have m, = 0; as long there 
is at least one j who places at least some probability on m > 0, mi = w/2 strictly dominates 
any lower announcement. 
442 
establish that there exist strict28 Nash equilibria that are nondegenerate 
and that any nondegenerate equilibrium of the mechanism is "close" 
to truthful reporting and gets closer the bigger the society. 
C. Approximate Efficiency 
While the results above resolve the incentive part of the paradox of the 
La Crema game, the efficiency characteristics are still somewhat puzzling, 
since in many cases fully Pareto-efficient allocations are not obtainable 
as an outcome of the game, even under truthful reporting. As it turns 
out, however, the allocation that results from truthful reporting is close 
to being efficient in large societies (even with heterogeneous prefer- 
ences), and thus so are the outcomes associated with nondegenerate 
equilibria. This is formalized as follows. 
Consider a sequence of economies Nh in the La Crema game satisfying 
assumption 1. Normalize utility functions so that ui(O) = 0 for each h 
and i E Nh. Furthermore, suppose that there exists a > 0 and a > 0 such 
that the following assumption is true. 
ASSUMPTION 2. a> ui(x) > a for all x E [0, 2C], h, and i E Nh. 
Assumption 2 bounds the derivative of ui uniformly across i. 
PROPOSITION 7. Consider a sequence of economies Nh in the La Crema 
game as described above (satisfying assumptions 1 and 2). Let the prob- 
ability that any farm burns be given by p > 0 and have this probability 
be independent across farms. (i) If a sequence of risk-sharing allocations 
{x^} Pareto-dominates {xw^} (the allocations associated with truthful re- 
porting in the La Crema game), then 
ZiENPaEUi(X) - Eui(X,h) 
-0 as h-oo. 
EiEmEUi(Xw'h) 
(ii) If a sequence of risk-sharing allocations {xh} Pareto-dominates the 
allocations of the La Crema game associated with a nondegenerate Nash 
equilibrium {xm"}, then 
EieNhEUi(Xh) - Eui(xm^h) 
- 0 as h -oo. 
EiEAEUi(xn ) 
The proof of proposition 7 uses a law of large numbers to tie down 
the expected property damage to the society. This means that the in- 
surance problem can be approximated by a situation in which a given 
household has a good idea of the cost of insurance and faces only its 
28 Such equilibria are also in undominated strategies and satisfy individual rationality 
constraints. Note, in fact, that in the La Crema game, a player by announcing mi = 0 
effectively does not participate, and so any equilibrium must satisfy an interim individual 
rationality constraint, and here it is satisfied strictly. 
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idiosyncratic risk of loss of property. In such a situation, truthful an- 
nouncements lead to approximately efficient outcomes, and so non- 
degenerate equilibria (which are approximately truthful) are also ap- 
proximately efficient. 
V. Conclusions 
We have shown that true reporting leads to the unique Pareto-efficient 
outcome of the La Crema game, but the corresponding allocation cannot 
be sustained as an exact equilibrium of this game as long as there is 
some heterogeneity in household value. However, we have also shown 
that if the society is large enough, true reporting is "almost" optimal, 
and that the nondegenerate equilibria of the game lead to outcomes 
that are close to being Pareto efficient. It is worth remarking that this 
efficient solution has been attained by a contractual mechanism that is 
also relatively simple. 
While the framework studied here is one with complete information 
about the valuations, these results hold even with private information. 
As we have shown, although truthful reporting is not an equilibrium 
(as long as some agents know that they are likely to have the highest 
or lowest wealth), in a large society, the deviations from truth telling by 
any household will be small as long as the household's property value 
is expected to be a relatively small amount of the aggregate announced 
property value. This robustness with respect to the information structure 
is important not just because it is more realistic. With complete infor- 
mation, there are formal mechanisms that "exactly" implement the ef- 
ficient outcome; this is not the case with incomplete information, which 
gives further interest in the La Crema institution. 
Mutual institutions with proportional payment/reimbursement rules 
are, as we discuss in the Introduction, a large part of the insurance 
business. But they occur in other markets. One is horse race betting: 
winning tickets earn back a fraction of total bets in proportion to how 
much one bets on the winning horse. That is usually referred to as "pari- 
mutuel" betting (Gulley and Scott 1989; Gabriel and Marsden 1990). 
National lottery systems often have this feature as well. This suggests 
that further exploring the mechanism may be a worthwhile enterprise. 
As a final observation, we note that the outcome of the La Crema game 
preserves the relative level of wealth for all households. This contrasts 
with Young's (1998, p. 132) observation that "the most stable contractual 
arrangements are those that are efficient, and more or less egalitarian, 
given the parties' payoff opportunities." An interesting question for fu- 
ture research would be to explain why, of all the possible efficient al- 
locations, the actual mechanism in use results in (something close to) 
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one that preserves the wealth ranking under this class of adverse 
contingencies. 
Appendix A 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Without loss of generality, assume that wn > ..> wl. Household i's expected 
payoff is then 
n n/ 
Eu,(m) = Eu (m) + - pk ui(wi), 
k=l k=l 
where, for all n > k 1, 
Eu(k)(m) = Pk m + uiM-(i - miM-m Mi)] 
seS *-1) M SeS(k)\S.(k-1) t M 
is the expected utility of household i when k farms burn. Fix some n > k > 1. 
Direct calculation gives 
dEu.i pl-)(m) 
where 
( ) ,Ms - ' ms\ M/ X \ V M-m MS-M Ak) (m) 2 ui m,i - i wi- mii M 
s=S(k-l) \ M SES(\S-- Mi M 
-m 'ui M V V^ Mii-M." 
seS(k-I)jjEN\s A1 M/ sES(k)\S (k1- ) jEsI \M ' 
We have 
n-1 
- 
l 
Isi(k1 ) I = (k- ) 
and 
IS(k) \S(k -I = (( )n-) (kn- ) 
Moreover, for all s E S,(k-1) and s' E S(k) \S(k-l), IN\sl = n- k and Is'l = k. There 
are thus 
k^_fn- 
I 
(n(- 1)! (n-k) (k-) = (k-1)!(n-k-1)! 
elements and 
k(n-1) (n-1)! k / (k- 1)!(n-k- 1)! 
elements, respectively, on the left-hand-side term and on the right-hand-side 
term of A(i) (m), that is, an identical number of elements for each sum. We then 
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group these terms two by two in the following way. Let s E S( -') and j E N\s. 
We can write s = {il = i, i,2 ..., ik}. Let s' be obtained from s by replacing iwith 
j, that is, s' = {i, = j, i2, ..., i,}. By construction, sn s' = {i2, ..., ik}, implying 
that M- Mj = M- M - mi + mj. Therefore, 
Alik) (M V V f M '( 
M- M,- Mi +w] 
A()(m) -= s - M[u' (mi - uw1Mi 
- 
M i)] 
For all s e S and j E N\s, let bii(s, m) = mi(M,M) and bij(s, m) = w,- mi(M- 
M,- mi + m)/M. Then 
EPk (lp ) [u'(bii(s, m)) - u'(b,(s, m))]. (Al) 
\mi k=l seS(i'-)jEN\sM 
In particular, when m = w = (w,, ..., w), and letting W = Si,Nwi and, for all 
s E S, Wt = W-i.,w, (the remaining wealth after firms in s have burnt), we 
get 
aEu, = (- w) Pk w 
a m =w Ak=I seS"^-)ENsW 
x W - U(( wu- w )] (A2) 
Suppose that, for some i, j E N, wi w z. Then clearly w, > w, implying that 
(aEuI/amI)lmw < 0 and (aEun/amI)lm-=w> O. In words, the poorest (respectively 
the richest) household has strict incentives to underreport (overreport), and 
w = (wl, ..., wn) is not a Nash equilibrium of the La Crema game. If, on the 
contrary, w, = w, = w, then, for all i E N, w, = w and (aEu/am)lm,w = 0, im- 
plying that w = (w,, ..., w. ) is a Nash equilibrium of the La Crema game. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Remark 1 
We proceed in five steps. 
1. Let us show first that (ml, m,) with mi * 0 and mi * 2C for all i E {1, 2) 
cannot be an equilibrium. If m' = (mI, m2) were an equilibrium, we would have 
9Eu, w^my fw,> 
-EUl mM2 -mm2 
a =O =W1- 
rm - m:=7n m' + m2 m, + m2 
dEu2 0 m2 M m2 
=0 = W2- 
a dm m=, n  ml + m2 ml + m2 
=2 m=m2 Wi=2 
mh + m2 
r^ m , 
2 = 2m2 
~~?which is impossible.2 
which is impossible. 
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2. The profile (m'l), ), with mn 0, cannot be an equilibrium since 
aEu2 = pl[u'(0) - u(w2)] >0. 
dm2 m=(mn,O0) 
Similarly, (0, '2), with m'2 0, cannot be an equilibrium. 
3. The profile (2C, m2) is not a Nash equilibrium. To see this, notice that the 
best response to 2Cis m'2 = 2w2C/(4C- w2), since (aEu2/am2)m.=(2C,,n) = 0, and 
m2 = 0, m2 = 2C produce lower payoffs than m' against 2C. However, the best 
response to 2w2C/(4C- w2) is not 2C, but rather 
m =( 2w,C (4w2,C 
'\4C-w^l \4C- Wl 
(which by assumption is smaller than 2C, since one can directly verify that this 
expression is less than 2C whenever w, < w2). 
4. The profile (2w,C/(4C- wl), 2C) is a Nash equilibrium. First, the unique 
best response to s = 2Cis m w, 2C/(4C- w). This also implies that (mi, 2C) with 
ml * 2w,C/(4C- wl) is not an equilibrium. Then notice that the only point 
m' at which (aEu2/am2)lr m=( ) = 0 is 
, 2w(C ) 4w,C 
W24c w 4C - W- 
and by assumption m' < 0 (note that the denominator is less than zero if and 
only if wl [ + (w2/4C)] < w2). Also, 
Eu2 = Pl[u'2(0) - u(w2)] >0, 
am2 m=(mr,0) 
which, added to the fact that m' <0 and continuity, implies that 
(aEu2/am2)lm=(,,) > 0. 
5. The only remaining case is m = (0, 0). This is trivially an equilibrium. The 
payoff to any player i in this case is that of autarchy, independently of the choice 
of mi. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Let c E DR2" be a consumption vector and MRS's(c) = (paui/ac,)/(p,du,/dc,) de- 
note the marginal rate of substitution of player i E N between two states r, s E 
S with respective probabilities Pr and p,. Pareto-efficient allocations are charac- 
terized by equal marginal rates of substitution across all agents in Nfor all states 
in S. In particular, given a message vector m E [0, 2C]" and r, s E S(1)'\{S,) u 
S(0)}, MRSr'(c(m)) = MRSj(c(m)) is equivalent to 
ui(wi- mi MM  U- ( M-Mr 
ui(wi-M MiM77s ,( M M 
uiw,- mi MM u)W%- m i 
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With identical CRRA utility functions, we get 
M-M, M-M, 
wi-mi M w-m M 
M-M, 
= 
m-_^^* (Ms-MM)(miw,- mw,) = 0. M-M- M-Ms 
wi- mi  w- M 
Therefore, either there exists some X E DR such that mk = XwA, for all k E N, or 
mk = ml = m, for all k, E N. Now, let s = S(') and r E S(')>\S,^() S,) }. Then 
MRSV"(c(m)) = MRS7'(c(m)) is equivalent to 
M-M, M-Mr 
w,-mi M w- m 
mi mi 
mi-miM w%-mM 
If mk = m for all k E N, this expression is equivalent to [w - (m/n)]/[m- 
(m/n)] = 1 for all i, j E N, which is incompatible with wi * wj for some i, j E 
N. We are thus left with m, = Xwk, for all k E Nfor some X E R. Let s E S(') and 
r E S). Then MRSs"(c(m)) = MRS7(c(m)) is equivalent to 
mi - mi(m/M) 
= 
j - mi(mi/M) X = ^- ** - 1. 
Wi W- 
Moreover, it is easy to check that all other marginal rates of substitution are 
equalized across agents when mi = wi for all i E N. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Remark 2 
Let the Walrasian price for a unit of consumption in state s be q,. The efficient 
allocation of La Crema leads to consumption of wi(W/W) for agent i in state s. 
Assume, for a contradiction, that the efficient allocation is a Walrasian equilib- 
rium. The budget constraint is given by 
S,eSq W so Si 
and dividing on both sides of the equation by wi, we obtain 
5^ qs W'= SE q, (A3) 
srS W soSi 
Optimality requires that the marginal rate of substitution between any two 
states r, s is equal to the ratio of consumption prices between these states. Let 
us normalize the price of consumption in the state in which no farm burns 
(r = {0}) to one. This implies that 
psAu'((ws/w)) p.[wi(W/W)] 1 p1 A -' 
poui(wi) p,wr -p P(o \w q) 
When the price is substituted in (A3), it follows that, for each i, 
se p \ s,po \WPo 
448 
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Eliminating the po, we have 
S (s sq ( Si 
Let S-' denote the states that would exist if i were not in the economy. So S has 
twice as many states as S-i. For s' E S-i, let W~ be the wealth in state s' if i were 
not in the economy. Keep W as the total wealth including i and p as the prob- 
ability that a farm burns. We rewrite the expression above as 
,,( P) ( 
+ 
W ) + p W ] = E p )(W + wi-1 IES w WS,Es-, w 
Rearranging terms, we get that 
E O p) "I~ I(w + + p ,|l = 0 (A4) 
must hold for each i. Now, let S-j,k denote the set of states in which neither j 
nor k is in the economy. Rewriting (A4), when i = j we get that 
p p2 {W ( + W)W + -1 
W W 
+p(1 -p)( W , + p2(- = 0. (A5) 
Similarly, from k's perspective, we get 
pE s p(, 2 (t W + W 
S'Fr-< ';k "-)- ( l 
+ (1 _p)p(Ww) + W [1 _(Waw +W ] 
+p(1P) %W ,+ p 
+p(- p)(SW i) +p2( )} =-0. (A6) 
Subtracting (A6) from (A5), we get 
E (1 )4(W", + wk (Ww-I , +r] w 0. 
But this cannot hold if Wk < w or if Wk> w, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 3 
Let us first consider n2 3. Given a message vector m E [0, 2C]" and r E S"\ 
{Si?u Si,?"}, s E S(), MRSVs(c(m)) = MRS;'(c(m)) is equivalent with identical 
CARA utility functions to 
M-M, M-M, 
wi - m - w, = w,- M -- w m , = m,. 
Now, let r e Si(), s E S(). Then MRS's(c(m)) = MRSJ(c(m)) is equivalent to 
mi mi 
mi- mi- wi = wj - mj- . 
Since mi = mj, this is equivalent to 
mi- m-- Wi = -mi mi = wi. M M 
Similarly we can also show that mj = w,, which is a contradiction with m, = 
mj and w, * Wu. Now let n = 2. Then, for r E S(?) and s E S(?, MRSl?(c(m)) = 
MRS'? (c(m)) is equivalent to 
m7 m2 m2 
ml - ml - -iW =-ml WI = ml 
ml + m2 ml + m2 ml + m2 
Similarly we can show that w2 = m2[m1/(ml + n2)], which is a contradiction 
with wl * w2. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Remark 3 
Let a message vector m E [0, 2C]" and r, s S()\(S?)uS()?}. Then 
MRS`s(c(m)) = MRS`s(c(m)) is equivalent with CRRA utility functions to 
M-M, 
wi mi 
1= M M,r= Ms M- M, 
wi - mi 
M 
Now, let s e Si0) and r e SVS u S}0}. Then MRS;(c(m)) = MRSr(c(m)) is 
m, 1 = i i= mi. 
The previous two equalities imply that w, = wj, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Fix h. We bound dEu, (w) /ami by an expression that is decreasing in nh. 
From (A2) we know that 
dEu, 
W 
, w 
= 1- 2EP L 
amid =l E S (k -liEN W 
_Ms |4 
- wi 
+M w 
This implies that 
aEu , +w, 
-- 
.. < max u' (wi -u 'i wi (A7) 
..... 
Ses( 
-1),Ujs ( WV i + w\1 
Note that 
W sW Ws- wiw+ w C-c 
w w- nhc 
Then by (A7) and assumption 1, for any ,j > 0, we can find H, such that, for 
any h>H,, 
dEu, I 
< 
dmi m=w 
for all i E Nh. Finally, given any E, choose A such that / = e/2C. Given the strict 
concavity of ui, it follows that the maximal gain from a report of some mi instead 
of wi is 2ClIEui/dmi < e for all i E Nh, where h> H,. This establishes the prop- 
osition. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Let a be a nondegenerate Nash equilibrium of the La Crema game. Consider i 
and a strategy profile a_i that does not place probability one on all players 
j * i playing 0. From (Al) we know that 
aEui(m) (1 m) iEu,(m) Z1= (si > [u'(bii(s, m)) - u'(bi(s, m))], Wmi M k=l sES(*-l)jeENMs 
where bii and bi are as defined in the proof of proposition 1. Consider any 
strategy profile mi, a_,: 
aEu,(m, a_,) f M(1 \> m. 
dmP =_ I |1--)2l 2 -\[ui(bii(s, [u m)) mi k= sjS(k-l)jeN\sM 
- u'(bi(s, m))] da ,(mi). (A8) 
Note that we can reverse the order of integration with respect to m_i and der- 
ivation with respect to mi (i.e., differentiate inside the integral in getting ex- 
pression [A8]) because the function aEui(mi, a_ )/dm, of mi is bounded on player 
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i's strategy set [0, 2C] for all a_i. Note that (A8) implies that any strategy with 
mi < w/2 is weakly dominated. This follows from noting that b,(s, m) < mi and 
bi(s, m) > wi - mi for any s and m_i, and so given the strict concavity of ui, the 
expression is strictly positive regardless of s and m_, provided that mi< w/2. 
Let (s*, m*) minimize u'(b,,(s*, m*)) - u'(bi(s*, m*)) over the support of mi, a_i. 
Equation (A8) and the concavity of ui also imply that 
d Eu,(mi cri)>f (l_ m)pk > [u'(bii(s*, m*)) 
,mi k=1 seS(k-l)jeN\sM 
- u(bij(s*, m*))]a doi(m i). 
Thus 
AEui(mi, 2-) [ut(bii(s, m*)) - ui(bij(s, m*))] Omi 
x f( - )Sp I2i(M (-i,). (A9) k=1 s = eS(-l)kjVNM? 
Given that a_i does not place probability one on all players j * i playing 0, the 
integral on the right-hand side of (A9) is strictly positive. Then it follows from 
(A9) that 0 2> Eui(mi, a_i)/9mi implies that 
0 > u'(b,i(s*, m*)) - u'(bj(s*, m*)). 
Thus, given assumption 1, 0 > Eui(mi, a_i)/ami implies that bi(s*, m*) > bij(s*, 
m*), which can be rewritten as 
m i> (A10) I1 + [(mi- m)/M*] (A 
Note that 1 > (mi - m;)/M* > -1. Then it follows from (A10) that if a_i does not 
place probability one on all players j * i playing 0, then a best reply by i must 
have support only on mi> w/2. This then implies that if a is a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium that does not place probability one on (0, ..., 0), it must be that 
the support of each aj is a subset of [wj/2, 2C]. This implies that 4C/W> 
(mi - mi*)/M*, and so from (A10) it follows that if a is a mixed-strategy equilibrium 
that does not place probability one on (0, ..., 0), it must be that, for each i 
and any mi that is a best response to a_, 
m +> w. (All) 
1+(4C/W) 
Let (s**, m**) maximize u'(bi(s**, m**)) - ui(bi(s**, m**)) over the support of mi, 
a_,. If a_i has the support of each aj as a subset of [w/2, 2C], then (A8) and 
the concavity of ui imply that 
[u'(bii(s**, m*)) - u'(bj(s**, m*))] I (1 - m) Pk^ S da_i(m_i) \ Mk=1 SESEu(in)jENsM 
> aEui(mi, o_i) 
dmi 
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Thus dEui(mi, a_,)/dmi 0 implies 
wi W> mi. (A12) 1 + [(mi - m*)/M**] ( 
Since 4C/W2 (mi,- m*)/M**, it follows that 
w W 
> mi, (A13) 1- (4C/W) ( 
and (All) and (A13) establish the proposition. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5 
The fact that any pure-strategy nondegenerate equilibrium involves only play of 
mi> w/2 such that 4C2/W> Imi- wil follows directly from the proof of propo- 
sition 6. Let us show that there exists such an equilibrium and that it is a strict 
equilibrium. We do this by showing that to any best response of m_i such that 
mj E [w,/2, 2C], there is a unique best response (which then must be in 
[w,/2, 2C] by proposition 6) that varies continuously in m_,. The result then 
follows from Kakutani's theorem. 
From the proof of proposition 6 it follows that dEu,(m)/m,i is continuous in 
m, and m_i and that dEui(m)/ami>O if mi<w,/2, and dEui(m)/dmi<O if mi> 
w,/[l - (4C/W)]. Thus there exists a point mi E [w,/2, wi[l - (4C/W)]] at which 
aEu,(m)/ami = 0. We show that, at any such point, a2Eui(m)/am2 < O. This implies 
that there are no local minima, which in turn implies that there is a unique 
such point. Direct calculation gives 
abii (1_m ('M 
dmi \ ~W \M 
-mi M 2M 
V 
i' 
a mi/_^] 2m/ mi 1 M il- =-M imi n 
leading to 
a2Eui(m) 
9m2 
Mk= ses(k-i)jeNr=\sMM 
<0 
( M) , ( M i) (M- M,- mi + mi) 
-1Mi ~P, 
E 
.mbM-miM-Ms-m'+m< 
<0 
-(i_M)i ^S 2S -j m. [ui(bi,,) - u(bj)]. k=l s?-S "'-l)jeN\sM 
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This second expression is -(2/M)[dEui(m)/ami], and so the whole expression is 
negative whenever aEui(m)/am,> 0. This concludes the proof. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 7 
We prove part i, since then part ii follows in a straightforward way from prop- 
osition 5 (and assumption 2). Let Wf = Eh^[W]. The weak law of large numbers9 
implies that 
hWh_ Prob[ whW >? - 0 (A14) 
for any e > . It follows from (A14), the continuity, and bounds on ui that for 
any > 0 there exists H such that 
Prob ui(w^ - Ui(, ) - < e (A15) 
for all i E Nh and any h> H. Let xh Pareto-dominate x^h. Suppose to the contrary 
of the proposition that there exists 6 > 0 such that 
>i,MEui(xh) - Eui(xh) 
Z,hEu(x) 
for infinitely many h. Let xh = (E[x], ..., E[x,^]) be the expected value of xh. 
Then by the concavity of u,, 
ZiEM ui( x) - Ei(w'h) 
iMEi >6 (A16) 
for infinitely many h. Given assumption 2, it follows from (A16) and the fact 
that xh Pareto-dominates xWh that for each such h we can find some y > 0 and 
vector xh such that Ei,A xi = EiM,ch and 
Ui(h ) -Eu,(x'h) > _y (A17) 
for all i E Nh. Then from (A15) it follows that 
for all i N, for infinitely many h. However, as both and w /W) sum to for l e Nh,  infinitely many . e er,  th x*  j(4W/ ')   
W1, this is a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
29 We apply a version covering sequences of heterogeneous but independent random 
variables (see, e.g., Billingsley 1979, theorem 6.2). Note here that ah/Wh -- 0, where ah is 
the standard deviation of Wh. This follows since Clnp(l - p) > a and Wh > nc. 
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Appendix B 
TABLE B1 
LA CREMA: LIST OF DAMAGES, 1884-1950 
Year Farm Name Value Damage Date Payment 
1884 Casale 470 December 24, 1886 
1885 Jarca 555 January 4, 1887 
1885 Planche 2,75 January 4, 1887 
1903 Peret 780 October 3, 1906 
1903 Mocho 800 October 3, 1906 
1906 Pascol 50 October 3, 1906 
1921 Grabiel 1,750 December 9, 1921 
1922 Borronet 40 June 29, 1922 
1923 Rauquet 14,5 April 2, 1923 
1922 Borr6 8,5 October 6, 1923 
1926 Jep 2,000 January 24, 1926 
1926 Fluis 10,5 January 24, 1926 
1926 Esclopet 10,75 January 24, 1926 
1926 Jep 1,300 March 29, 1930 
1936 Toni Forn 1,800 August 16, 1937 
1936 Toni Forn 750 June 2, 1938 
1937 Casale 80 June 2, 1938 
1939 Anraulat 250 June 12, 1939 
1942 Vecaina 50 January 18, 1948 
1948 Peretol 3,165 June 2, 1949 
1950 Armany 72 February 2, 1950 
SOURCE.-La Crema book, Benito Marquet Armengol, Cal Ton de Borr6, Canillo. 
TABLE B2 
LA CREMA: REPORTED VALUATIONS, 1929 
OTHER PROPERTIES INSURED 
FARM NAME VALUATION PERCENT HOUSE BARN (Truncated at 8) 
Andrieta 
Anrauladet 
Armany 
As6 
Aleix 
Agusti Farre 
Albellana 
Borronet 
Borr6 
Barnat 
Bondancia 
Batista 
Branqueta 
Bacar6 
Bartol1 
Barbet 
Bonavida 
Borjes 
Bartreta 
Bit6 
Bregad6s 
Casadet 
Call 
1,380 
1,450 
1,760 
450 
820 
900 
900 
1,750 
1,020 
350 
941 
875 
1,060 
550 
1,850 
350 
1,800 
1,400 
940 
660 
400 
1,050 
1,750 
1.070 
1.125 
1.365 
.349 
.636 
.698 
.698 
1.357 
.791 
.271 
.730 
.679 
.822 
.427 
1.435 
.271 
1.396 
1.086 
.729 
.512 
.310 
.814 
1.357 
400 
250 
600 
200 
250 
500 
300 
600 
550 
200 
130 
300 
250 
250 
500 
200 
500 
200 
300 
160 
200 
300 
300 
400 
250 
500 
200 
100 
400 
100 
500 
450 
150 
300 
200 
150 
200 
400 
150 
300 
400 
100 
250 
200 
300 
250 
400 50 
200 150 
60 500 
50 
50 160 
150 200 
450 200 
20 
90 15 
150 225 
150 200 
100 
300 350 
300 400 
200 200 
310 10 
250 
350 100 
50 50 
80 50 
200 400 
100 
160 50 50 
150 
200 
60 
250 
100 
200 
40 
190 16 
250 
50 
100 100 
200 
180 
250 100 300 450 
TABLE B2 
(Continued) 
OTHER PROPERTIES INSURED 
(Truncated at 8) 
500 50 250 
160 110 100 
500 100 150 
400 400 400 200 
200 
250 
250 
200 80 40 
100 
100 
20 60 60 200 200 
300 200 
200 100 
350 100 
250 150 150 
300 50 50 
400 50 
250 250 
200 
200 150 
200 150 350 60 300 
300 100 600 100 
300 600 
225 225 175 60 
200 150 150 50 
80 
300 100 
300 200 70 
150 150 200 400 
400 
250 150 50 
300 50 
300 500 150 200 
400 
210 64 550 250 
400 200 300 
350 
25 250 50 40 
50 60 
400 150 
100 150 450 
50 200 50 
100 
300 150 250 50 
300 200 310 
500 
100 400 300 
305 300 100 350 200 
FARM NAME 
Casale 
Candela 
Cabal1 
Llecsia 
Hble. ComU 
Concha 
Calb6 
Comet 
Canaro 
Esclopet 
Franca 
Frances 
Farr6 nou 
Fluis 
Fontana 
Gast6 
Gabach6 
Gabacha 
Grabiel 
Janramon 
Jandelsastre 
Jaumina 
Janet 
Jarca 
Janet6 
Jordi 
Jumpere 
Jep 
Jesuita 
Jaunsaus 
Jove Victorio 
Jaume Goral 
Josep 
Escriba 
Hostet 
Llarch 
Llecsia 
Martisella 
Mas-Cortal 
Mas-mereichs 
Mandraga 
Mangaucha 
Mariano 
Marti 
Maistre 
Mora 
Mocho 
Moln6 
Molines 
d'Andorra 
Muyer6 
MestranCa 
Mijera 
Naudi 
Paj6 
Panset 
Pallis6 
Patjeta 
Puncernal 
VALUATION 
1,450 
300 
600 
658 
1,750 
2,500 
600 
1,000 
1,000 
200 
1,070 
280 
400 
430 
1,140 
1,300 
900 
1,400 
1,350 
920 
1,350 
300 
1,300 
700 
1,100 
1,970 
1,900 
200 
1,250 
1,235 
600 
400 
2,300 
580 
1,100 
1,320 
3,200 
1,800 
650 
1,150 
1,000 
2,250 
1,300 
1,624 
500 
1,850 
1,200 
1,465 
480 
250 
1,500 
220 
250 
2,785 
1,350 
1,500 
PERCENT 
1.125 
.233 
.465 
.510 
1.357 
1.939 
.465 
.776 
.776 
.155 
.830 
.217 
.310 
.334 
.884 
1.008 
.698 
1.086 
1.047 
.714 
1.047 
.233 
1.008 
.543 
.853 
1.528 
1.474 
.155 
.970 
.958 
.465 
.310 
1.784 
.450 
.853 
1.024 
2.482 
1.396 
.504 
.892 
.776 
1.745 
1.008 
1.260 
.388 
1.435 
.931 
1.136 
.372 
.194 
1.163 
.171 
.194 
2.160 
1.047 
1.163 
HOUSE 
300 
150 
350 
160 
500 
700 
200 
400 
250 
100 
300 
200 
150 
130 
300 
400 
400 
500 
400 
270 
500 
200 
600 
250 
400 
400 
200 
200 
200 
300 
600 
400 
600 
250 
350 
300 
600 
700 
400 
400 
350 
400 
500 
200 
200 
450 
350 
500 
250 
250 
500 
100 
250 
410 
350 
400 
BARN 
350 
150 
250 
128 
500 
400 
200 
350 
500 
100 
450 
80 
150 
200 
300 
400 
200 
450 
400 
250 
400 
100 
200 
250 
350 
400 
600 
150 
250 
600 
250 
350 
450 
1,000 
700 
250 
300 
300 
400 
400 
250 
300 
500 
500 
600 
230 
250 
120 
310 
500 
300 
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TABLE B2 
(Continued) 
OTHER PROPERTIES INSURED 
FARM NAME VALUATION PERCENT HOUSE BARN (Truncated at 8) 
40 150 50 100 100 
50 200 50 30 
50 
100 500 
100 400 
50 
100 
100 
200 
50 
300 
400 100 250 300 100 
50 100 50 150 150 
350 550 100 
150 80 100 
16 50 
500 150 150 
50 300 200 50 
250 200 
100 
20 250 200 70 50 50 
400 
SOURCE.-La Crema book, Benito Marquet Armengol, Cal Ton de Borro, Canillo. 
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280 
120 
100 
100 
150 
250 
100 
200 
200 
24 
500 
120 
200 
200 
200 
50 
200 
100 
300 
300 
200 
900 
Peret 
Peretol 
Popaire 
Potablanch 
Ponet 
Piedro 
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